Medical conscience exemptions After listening to a talk by Christopher Kaczor, and the ensuing discussion, I want to offer a defense of a moderate position on the state not compelling healthcare professionals to violate their conscience, even when their conscience is unreasonably mistaken. This is the central insight: It is a significant harm to an individual to violate their conscience, even when the conscience is irrationally mistaken.
Vagueness And The Sorites Paradox. A vague predicate admits of at least one dimension of variation and typically more than one in its intended range along which we are at a loss when to say the predicate ceases to apply, though we start out confident that it does.
It is this feature of them that the sorites arguments exploit. Exactly how is part of the subject of The majority of philosophers writing on vagueness take it to be a kind of semantic phenomenon. If we are right, they are correct in this assumption, which is surely the default position, but they have not so far provided a satisfactory account of the implications of this or a satisfactory diagnosis of the sorites arguments.
Other philosophers have urged more exotic responses, which range from the view that the fault lies not in our language, but in the world, which they propose to be populated with vague objects which our semantics precisely reflects, to the view that the world and language are both perfectly in order, but that the fault lies with our knowledge of the properties of the words we use epistemicism.
In contrast to the exotica to which some philosophers have found themselves driven in an attempt to respond to the sorites puzzles, we undertake a defense of the commonsense view that vague terms are semantically vague.
Our strategy is to take fresh look at the phenomenon of vagueness. Rather than attempting to adjudicate between different extant theories, we begin with certain pre-theoretic intuitions about vague terms, and a default position on classical logic.
The aim is to see whether i a natural story can be told which will explain the vagueness phenomenon and the puzzling nature of soritical arguments, and, in the course of this, to see whether ii there arises any compelling pressure to give up the natural stance.
We conclude that there is a simple and natural story to be told, and we tell it, and that there is no good reason to abandon our intuitively compelling starting point. The importance of the strategy lies in its dialectical structure.
Not all positions on vagueness are on a par. Some are so incredible that even their defenders think of them as positions of last resort, positions to which we must be driven by the power of philosophical argument. We aim to show that there is no pressure to adopt these incredible positions, obviating the need to respond to them directly.
If we are right, semantic vagueness is neither surprising, nor threatening. It provides no reason to suppose that the logic of natural languages is not classical or to give up any independently plausible principle of bivalence. Properly understood, it provides us with a satisfying diagnosis of the sorites argumentation.
It would be rash to claim to have any completely novel view about a topic so well worked as vagueness.
But we believe that the subject, though ancient, still retains its power to inform and challenge us. This runs counter to much of the literature on vagueness, which commonly assumes that, though some applications of vague predicates to objects fail to be truth-evaluable, in clear positive and negative cases vague sentences are unproblematically true or false.
It is clarity on this, and related points, that removes the puzzles associated with vagueness, and helps us to a satisfying diagnosis of why the sorites arguments both seem compelling and yet so obviously a bit of trickery.
We give a proof that semantically vague predicates neither apply nor fail-to-apply to anything, and that consequently it is a mistake to diagnose sorites arguments, as is commonly done, by attempting to locate in them a false premise.
Sorites arguments are not sound, but not unsound either. We offer an explanation of their appeal, and defend our position against a variety of worries that might arise about it.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We first introduce an important distinction in terms of which we characterize what has gone wrong with vague predicates.
We characterize what we believe to be our natural starting point in thinking about the phenomenon of vagueness, from which only a powerful argument should move us, and then trace out the consequences of accepting this starting point.
We consider the charge that among the consequences of semantic vagueness are that we must give up classical logic and the principle of bivalence, which has figured prominently in arguments for epistemicism. We argue there are no such consequences of our view: Next, we offer a diagnosis of what has gone wrong in sorites arguments on the basis of our account.
Next, we discuss some worries that may arise about the intelligibility of our linguistic practices if our account is correct. We argue none of these worries should force us from our intuitive starting point.
Finally, we cast a quick glance at other forms of semantic incompleteness.Propositions and Their Constituent Facts: An Essay in Pointillist Metaphysics. Speaker: Aviv Hoffmann From: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem URL: https://philpapers.
This volume brings together many of Terence Horgan's essays on paradoxes: Newcomb's problem, the Monty Hall problem, the two-envelope paradox, the sorites paradox, and the Sleeping Beauty problem. the two-envelope paradox, the sorites paradox, and the Sleeping Beauty problem.
and an essay on epistemic probability that articulates and. Let #s be the Goedel number of srmvision.com following fact is useful for thinking about the foundations of mathematics: Proposition.
There is a finite fragment A of Peano Arithmetic such that if T is a recursively axiomatizable theory, then there is an arithmetical formula P T (n) such that for all arithmetical sentences s, A → P T (#s) is a theorem of FOL if and only if T proves s.
The vagueness or indeterminacy that underwrites this sorites paradox is, on this approach, not a result of epistemic limitations, nor a result of indeterminacy in Everest itself but, rather, arises as a result of indeterminacy surrounding what to count as the referent of the term. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews is an electronic, the Two-Envelope Paradox, the sorites paradox, and the Sleeping Beauty problem. The titular paradoxes, however, largely serve as loci for reflection on practical rationality and epistemic probability. and the final 'big picture' essay. A novel account of epistemic probability is. The sorites paradox can also be constructed using other predicates such as , grains of sand is a heap of sand, thus 99, grains is still a heap of sand, as is 99, and so forth, till I am forced to conclude that one grain of sand is still a heap of sand.
Fideisms Judaism is the Semitic monotheistic fideist religion based on the Old Testament's ( BCE) rules for the worship of Yahweh by his chosen people, the children of Abraham's son Isaac (c BCE)..
Zoroastrianism is the Persian monotheistic fideist religion founded by Zarathustra (cc BCE) and which teaches that good must be chosen over evil in order to achieve salvation. In art, essentialism is the idea that each medium has its own particular strengths and weaknesses, contingent on its mode of communication.
A chase scene, for example, may be appropriate for motion pictures, but poorly realized in poetry, because the essential components of the poetic medium are ill suited to convey the information of a chase scene.. This idea may be further refined, and it. The Sorites Paradox And The Epistemic Philosophy Essay Soritic thinking that is based on reasoning, which is entailed in the sorites paradox plays an important role in some forms of weakness of will.